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THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ ON
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
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United States v. Lopez, which held a statute unconstitutional for
exceeding Congress's commerce power, raises complex issues
regarding federalism and the nature and scope of federal authority
under the Commerce Clause. The decision is significant in relation
to environmental regulation because many environmental protection
statutes were passed pursuant to the commerce power and may now
be susceptible to challenge. This Article assesses the vulnerability of
certain provisions of the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act in light of the Lopez decision. In particular, the Article
explores whether the destruction of isolated wetlands and the
degradation of endangered species' habitat are economic activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. While plausible
arguments may be made to the contrary, this author ultimately
concludes that the analyzed provisions satisfy Lopez, and are thus
capable of withstanding constitutional challenge.
INTRODUcTION
Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, Congress
has the power to regulate interstate commerce. Because courts have
defined the commerce power quite broadly since the 1930s, Congress
has enjoyed some sixty years of essentially plenary legislative power.
So long as Congress could show that the reguilated activity affects"
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interstate commerce, however indirectly, the Court would uphold the
exercise of federal authority.'
Despite broad judicial interpretation giving the Commerce Clause
seemingly infinite reach, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently adhered to the notion that the commerce power is
limited Until its five-to-four decision in United States v. Lopez,3
issued April 26, 1995, however, the Court seemed unable to fix an
outer limit on the commerce power.4 In Lopez, the Court held that
Congress had exceeded the authority granted to it by the Commerce
Clause in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.'
In reaching its decision, the majority ruled that under the
Commerce Clause, Congress can permissibly regulate economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.6  Possession
of a gun in a school zone, however, was found to be a noncommer-
cial, purely local activity in an area of regulation traditionally left to
the states, and thus beyond the reach of the commerce power.7
Though Lopez purports to be a Commerce Clause decision, the
majority opinion seems influenced more by an underlying concern
for protection of state sovereignty than by the absence of a nexus to
interstate commerce! In reaching its conclusion that possession of
a gun in a school zone is not an economic activity that substantially
1. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding imposition of federal
standards for minimum wage and maximum hours under Fair Labor Standards Act); Wickard
v. Filburfi, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of wheat grown for home
consumption).
2. See, eg., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) (reasoning that the
enumeration of powers "presupposes something not enumerated"); National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (warning that the scope of
commerce authority "must be considered in light of our dual system of government" and may
not be so expansive as to "create a completely centralized government"); United States v. Lopez,
115 S.Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (indicating the commerce power is limited by the enuneration of
powers doctrine and concepts of federalism).
3. 115 S.CL 1624 (1995).
4. Starting with its decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court had not found any
instance in which Congress exceeded its commerce authority until its decision in Lopez.
5. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 forbids any individual from knowingly
possessing a firearm in a place he knows to be a school zone. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994).
6. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630.
7. Id. at 1634.
8. For instance, the Court "pause[ld] to consider the implications of the Government's
arguments" and concluded they were limitless: "Under the theories that the Government
presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even
in areas.., where [the] States historically have been sovereign." Id. at 1632.
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affects interstate commerce, the Court focused on the impact that
upholding the Act would have on state sovereignty.9
As the first case in some sixty years to strike a statute for
exceeding congressional power under the Commerce Clause, Lopez
has understandably sparked a flurry of legal commentary, much of
which has focused on the issue of federalism.1" Lopez, however,
also presents a new opportunity to challenge other statutes enacted
pursuant to that authority.1 In particular, environmental protection
statutes, grounded as they are for the most part on the commerce
power, may now be susceptible to Commerce Clause challenges. This
article assesses the vulnerability of certain provisions of selected
environmental statutes, specifically, the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act.'"
9. See id. at 1634. The majority decision indicates a willingness to protect the distinction
between what is truly local and what is truly national. The Court declined to accept the
government's causal connections to interstate commerce because to do so would "convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States." Id. Echoing a concern for preserving state sovereignty, Justice Kennedy
stated: "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional
state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political
responsibility would become illusory." Id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
10. See, eg., Anthony B. Ching, Travelling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez,
New York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 99 (1995); John
P. Frantz, Recent Developments, The Reemergence of the Commerce Clause as a Limit on
Federal Power, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 174 (1995); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking
Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REv. 795 (1996); Stephen M. Mcjohn, The Impact of
United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUo. L. REV. 1 (1995); Russell
F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. RIv. 71 (1996); Barry C. Toone &
Bradley J. Wiskirchen, Note, Great Expectations: The Illusion of Federalism after United States
v. Lopez, 22 J. LEGIS. 241 (1996); Russell L. Weaver, Lopez and the Federalization of Criminal
Law, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 815 (1996).
11. See, eg., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911 (1995); Kelly G. Black, Comment, Removing Intrastate Lawsuits: The Affecting-Commerce
Argument after United States v. Lopez, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1103 (1995); Kathleen A. Burdette,
Comment, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child Support Enforcement after United States v.
Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1469 (1996); Ronald S. Kornreich, Note, The Constitutionality of
Punishing Deadbeat Parents: The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 after United States v.
Lopez, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089 (1995).
12. For additional articles addressing this and related topics see, Michael Bablo, Note,
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States: Does the Recent Supreme Court Decision in United States v.
Lopez Dictate the Abrogation of the "Migratory Bird Rule"?, 14 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. J.
277 (1995) (arguing tenuous connection between migratory birds and interstate commerce does
not satisfy the tests enunciated in Lopez); Jonathan G. Hieneman, Note and Comment, The
Shrinking Reach of the Commerce Power: Is Wetland Jurisdiction in Danger?, 10 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 341 (1994-1995) (suggesting Congress is without authority under
Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate isolated wetlands'solely on the potential presence of
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Being the first case in decades to find that Congress exceeded its
power under the Commerce Clause, Lopez may signal a new phase
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence with far-reaching implications. To
appreciate the significance of Lopez, it is necessary to understand its
historical context. Section I of this article reviews landmark Com-
merce Clause cases preceding Lopez. Because preservation of the
proper balance between state and federal authority is an underlying
theme of Lopez, Section II of this article also discusses attempts by
the Court to develop a working concept of federalism. The Lopez
decision itself is then analyzed in Section III, and the application of
the Lopez standard to environmental regulations is analyzed in
Section IV. Lopez presents little threat to many federal environmen-
tal protection statutes, such as pollution abatement statutes, because
the regulated activity is economic and substantially affects interstate
commerce. In other areas of regulation, however, such as the
regulation of isolated wetlands, the outcome is not as certain because
the connection to interstate commerce is more attenuated. Ultimately,
the implications of Lopez will depend on the manner in which the
Court defines the terms "economic" and "substantially affects," and
the extent to which the Court protects principles of federalism.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRU-
DENCE
The United States Constitution creates a federal government of
specifically enumerated powers. 3 One of the powers delegated to
Congress in the Constitution is the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
migratory waterfowl); J. Blanding Holman IV, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean
Water Act and the Endahgered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL.
LJ. 139 (1995) (analyzing potential application of Lopez to CWA and ESA); Edward Alburo
Morrissey, Legislative Reform, The Jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act over Isolated Wetlands.
The Migratory Bird Rule, 22 J. LEGIS. 137 (1996) (advocating amendment to CWA to extend
legislative protection to isolated wetlands potentially used by migratory birds). See also, Stephen
M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, But Hardly Epochal for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 33 (1996) (arguing that federal environmental laws, including
Section 9 of ESA and Section 404 of CWA, will continue to be immune to Commerce Clause
challenges after Lopez). Professor Johnson's article, published after this article was completed,
was not reviewed in preparation of this article. However, it addresses similar issues and reaches
similar conclusions.
13. The Constitution provides a lengthy list of enumerated powers that Congress can
exercise. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18. Congress can only exercise powers derived from this
list. See e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991) (holding that the federal government
has limited powers).
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with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes[.]"' 4 It is this clause to which most federal power can
be traced.'5
A. Gibbons v. Ogden: The Roots of Modern Commerce Power
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce has traditional-
ly been interpreted quite broadly. The nature of the commerce power
was first described by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden.6
Indeed, the breadth the commerce power has enjoyed is said to have
its roots in Gibbons.7 At issue in Gibbons was the constitutionality
of a New York statute that granted an exclusive franchise permitting
steamships to trade between New York and New Jersey only with the
permission of the franchisee.'Y The Court held that navigation could
be regulated under the commerce power even while the vessel was
within the interior waters of a state and not merely at the boundary
,where it crossed into the waters of another.'9
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall described Con-
gress's authority under the Commerce Clause broadly as the power
"to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed."'
Marshall wrote: "This power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, nray be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1987) ("The labor statutes, the civil rights statutes, the farm and agricultural statutes, and
countless others rest on the commerce power, or more accurately on a construction of the
commerce clause that grants the federal government jurisdiction so long as it can show (as it
always can) that, the regulated activity burdens, obstructs, or affects interstate commerce,
however indirectly.").
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-190 (1824).
17. See, e.g., James M. Maloney, Note, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The
Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. REv.
1795, 1803 (1994); Epstein, supra note 15, at 1400.
18. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 1401 n.36. See also, Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. In
response to the New York statute, New Jersey passed a retaliatory law allowing citizens of New
Jersey sued in New York for violating the New York law to recover treble damages against the
New York citizen in a New Jersey court. Epstein, supra note 15, at 1401 n.36.
19. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194 ("Commerce among the States, cannot stop at
the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior."); see also
Maloney, supra note 17, at 1804.
20. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
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[C]onstitution.,, 21  Despite this seemingly sweeping language,
Gibbons specifically recognized limitations on the commerce power
inherent in the language of the Commerce Clause itself.
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that
commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on
between man and man in a State, or between different parts
of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect
other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is
certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as the word 'among'
is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which
concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which
would probably have been selected to indicate the complete-
ly interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase
for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular
classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended,
would not have been made, had the intention been to extend
the power to every description. The enumeration presuppos-
es something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be
the exclusive internal commerce of a State.'
Thus, even the earliest analysis of the commerce power recognized
limits on that power inherent in the clause itself.
B. Early Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
During the first century following the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court rarely was required to determine the
authority of Congress to legislate under an exercise of its commerce
power.' Rather, the predominant issue in early Commerce Clause
jurisprudence was the authority of the States to regulate matters that
would be within the commerce power had Congress chosen to act.24
21. Id.
22. Id. at 194-95; see diso, Epstein, supra note 15 (explaining Gibbons); Maloney, supra note
17.
23. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942).
24. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624,1634 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also,
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121 (noting the primary focus of the early cases was the permissibility of
state activity that was claimed to discriminate against or burden interstate commerce).
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When eventually presented with the question of the scope of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, the Court
applied various, often conflicting approaches. In some cases, the
Court struck legislation by applying formalistic distinctions between
"manufacture," "mining," or "production," and "commerce."'  The
Court also drew distinctions between "direct" and "indirect" effects
on commerce, striking regulation of activity that exerted only an
indirect effect on commerce.26 Other decisions addressed Congress's
authority to prohibit the interstate movement of items in commerce27
and the instruments of commerce.28
C. Modern Commerce Power
Eventually the Court recognized that many types of intrastate
activity had such effects on interstate commerce as to make the
intrastate activity a proper subject for federal regulation 9 A key
point for modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence was reached in
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,3"
25. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (applying manufacture-
commerce distinction to hold manufacturers' combined control of some 98% domestic sugar
refining capacity beyond the reach of Sherman Act; Court reasoned that conspiracies to control
manufacture, agriculture, mining, production, wages, or prices had too "indirect" an effect on
interstate commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918), overruled by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (striking statute prohibiting interstate shipment of goods
produced by child labor as regulating "manufacturing" rather than "commerce"); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (striking statute prohibiting unfair labor practices
in coal industry as regulating "mining" and "production" rather than "commerce").
26. See, eg., Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 309 (holding no congressional authority to
regulate wages and hours for miners and price of coal because such had only secondary and
indirect effect on interstate commerce); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495,548 (1935) (holding wage and hour provisions of National Industrial Recovery Act had
no direct relation to interstate commerce); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S.
330,368 (1935) (holding mandatory retirement and pefision plan for railroad employees was too
remote from any regulation of commerce as commerce); see also, Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121
(describing development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
27. See, e.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding congressional power to prohibit
interstate movement of lottery tickets). But see Hammer, 247 U.S. 251 (striking down prohibition
on interstate transportation of goods manufactured in violation of child labor laws).
28. See, e.g., Houston, E.-& W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234
U.S. 342 (1914) (Court upheld federal rate schedules for interstate carriers reasoning that
congressional power over interstate carriers as instruments of interstate commerce extended to
the incidental regulation of intrastate commerce having a close and substantial relationship to
interstate traffic).
29. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123.
30. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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decided by the Court in 1937. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court
abandoned the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects on
interstate commerce and held that it is within Congress's power to
regulate intrastate activities that have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce as to burden commerce. 31 The
Court also declined to apply the manufacturing/commerce distinction
expounded in earlier cases. 2 Instead, the Court concluded that
labor relations were within the broad powers of Congress to protect
interstate commerce from burdens and 6bstructions, regardless of the
source.
33
In the years following Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court defined
the reach of the commerce power expansively. Over time, the Court
discarded the distinctions that had previously limited the exercise of
the commerce power. For instance, in United States v. Darby," the
Court declared that Congress's power over interstate commerce is not
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. Overruling
earlier precedent,35 Darby held that Congress had the power to
exclude any article from interstate commerce.36  Darby determined
that Congress's power over interstate commerce extends to those
intrastate activities "which so affect interstate commerce ... as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce."37
The expansive interpretation of the commerce power started by
Jones & Laughlin Steel reached its peak in Wickard v. Filburn.
38
31. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)
(Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 which granted
employees the right to form unions, imposed duties to engage in collective bargaining, and
created the National Labor Relations Board, with power to act against unfair labor practices
affecting commerce).
32. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936).
33. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 36-37.
34. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act prohibiting interstate
shipment of goods if minimum wage and maximum hour standards were violated respecting
anyone employed in their production).
35. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
36. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115-16.
37. Id. at 118.
38. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Court in Lopez described Wickard as perhaps the most far-
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity. United States v. Lopez,
115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). In Wickard, Filburn owned a small farm on which he raised cattle
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Wickard held that a farmer who raised grain, not for market but
solely for his own use, was subject to regulation under the Commerce
Clause. The Court determined that formalistic distinctions such as
those between direct and indirect effects or between production and
commerce had no bearing on the scope of the commerce power.39
Although the growing of small quantities of wheat for home consump-
tion might have been trivial by itself it was "far from trivial" when
cumulated with like behavior of similarly situated farmers.4°  Thus,
even if an activity had a minimal effect on interstate commerce, the
Court ruled that Congress could have found it necessary to regulate
home-grown wheat in order to control nationwide wheat markets.41
Wickard thus signaled the beginning of judicial deference to congres-
sional findings that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce,
where such findings have any rational basis.42
As the Court discarded its earlier distinctions limiting the
commerce power, three alternative bases for justifying legislation
emerged. Under the commerce power, Congress could (1) regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce;43 (2) protect goods
or people in commerce and the instrumentalities of interstate
and poultry. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114. It was Filburn's practice to plant a small acreage of winter
wheat, sown in the fall and harvested the following July. Id Filbum customarily sold part .of the
harvest, used part to feed his livestock and poultry, milled a portion into flour for home
consumption, and kept the rest for the following seeding. Id. Amendments, 55 Stat. 203 (1941),
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, established a wheat acreage allotment
of 11.1 acres and a normal yield of 20.1 bushels of wheat per acre. Id. Filburn planted 11.9 acres
more than allotted, which yielded him an excess of 239 bushels of wheat. Id. Under the terms
of the Act, this wheat was a market excess subject to a penalty of 49 cents per bushel. Id. at 114-
15. The Court sustained the application of the Act to Filburn in part because one of the
purposes of the Act was to increase the market price of wheat by limiting the volume that could
affect the market. Id at 128. The Court reasoned that wheat grown for home consumption that
was in a marketable condition might flow into the market due to the attractive rising prices,
thereby counteracting price increases. Id. The Court further reasoned that even if it never
actually enters the market, wheat grown for home consumption competes with wheat in
conmmerce because the farmer who grew it would otherwise satisfy his needs by purchasing it
on the open market. Id.
39. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120, 124-25 ("[Q]uestions of federal power cannot be decided
simply by finding the activity in question to be 'production,' nor can consideration of its
economic effects be foreclosed by calling them 'indirect."').
46. Id. at 127-28 (Court reasoned that wheat grown for home consumption overhangs the
market and competes with wheat in the market by reducing the amount of wheat the farmer
would otherwise purchase in the open market)..
41. Id. at 128-29.
42. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,276-80
(1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
43. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 100.
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commerce;44 and (3) regulate activities affecting commerce.'a  This
was the status of modem commerce jurisprudence when the Court
decided to hear Lopez.
Another limit on Congress's commerce power comes not from
judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause itself, but from the
Tenth Amendment, discussed in Section II.
II. FEDERALISM AND TENTH AMENDMENT
LIMITATIONS ON COMMERCE POWER
Despite the ever-expanding view of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause, the Court has nevertheless continued to
adhere to the notion that the commerce power is limited.46 In some
sixty years of modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, the
Court has identified few boundaries on the commerce power. One
particular issue with which the Court has struggled is whether state
sovereignty imposes a limitation on the commerce powers of
Congress.
In balancing congressional power under the Commerce Clause
against states' rights under the Reservation of Powers Clause of the
Tenth Amendment, the Court has traditionally found that a lawful
exercise of the commerce power does not infringe on state sovereign-
ty. 7 In Maryland v. Wirtz, the Court upheld the application of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to state-operated schools and hospitals.48
The Court found that where a state was acting in a manner that
resembled other employers, it would be subject to federal regulations
to the same degree as other employers.49 If the general regulations
were within the commerce power, it made no difference whether a
44. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241.
45. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1625,1628 (1995); National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (noting that the commerce power
must be viewed in light of our dual system of government).
47. See, eg., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,196-97 (1968), overruled by National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
48. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 201 (the particular issue in Wirtz was the applicability of federal
minimum wage and maximum hour regulations in the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees
of state-operated schools and hospitals).
49. Ild. at 193-94. The Court also noted that the federal statute would apply even to what
might be considered core governmental functions as well as proprietary activities. Id. at 196-97.
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state was among the regulated entities.5" Thus, the application of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to the states did not infringe on state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment. 1
Some years later, in National League of Cities v. Usery 2 the
Court held that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress power
to regulate "the States as States."53 The Court found that the Tenth
Amendment acted as a substantive limit on the commerce power.54
The Court recognized an express declaration of limitation from the
language of the Tenth Amendment itself: "The [Tenth] Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system."55 Thus, the Court
concluded that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority
because the challenged regulations operated directly to displace the
states' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions.5 6
50. Id. at 196-97.
51. Id. at 198-99. In a subsequent case, Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1925), although
upholding the exercise of congressional commerce authority, the Court signaled a retreat by
positing that state governments might be less subject to federal regulation than other entities.
Id. at 548. In his dissent to Fry, Justice Rehnquist voiced concerns that the regulations in
question violated affirmative limits on the ability of Congress to regulate traditional
governmental activities of the states. ld. at 557-59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The tenor of this
dissent was adopted the following term as the majority opinion in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
52. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
53. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842. At issue in National League of Cities was
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to state and local governments. By a sharply
divided vote, the Court ruled that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act against the States "in areas of traditional
governmental functions." Id. at 852.
54. Id. at 842. The Court reasoned that the very structure of the federal system of
government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of
the States as States through the exercise of the commerce power. Id. In attempting to ascertain
the scope of such limits, the Court drew an analogy between individual rights granted by the
Constitution and States' rights. That is, even a federal statute passed under the commerce
authority would be invalid if it violated some individual right such as the right to a fair trial or
to due process. Likewise, a federal statute passed under the commerce authority could not
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions. Id. at 852.
55. Id. at 843 (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 547).
56. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. Although National League of Cities listed
several examples of "traditional government functions" such as fire prevention, police protection
and public health, it did not identify guidelines by which lower courts could distinguish between
a traditional and nontraditional function when considering the issue of state immunity under the
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Less than a decade later, National League of Cities was over-
turned by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority in which the
Court held that congressional power under the Commerce Clause is
not limited by the sovereignty of states." -Garcia completely
redefined the Court's approach to the issue of federalism In
overturning National League of Cities, the Court, in essence, rejected
the idea of judicially created substantive limits on congressional power
to regulate under the Commerce Clause, choosing instead to rely on
the intrinsic protections of the political process inherent in the
structure of the federal system. 9
While adhering to the political process view of federalism, the
Court, in New York v. United States, nevertheless ruled that Congress
did not have constitutional authority to "commandeer n the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program."'  Although the decision in
Commerce Clause. Id. at 851. Identifying which functions were immune from regulation proved
to be a difficult task for the lower courts, and frequently resulted in inconsistent and arbitrary
distinctions. Compare Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969
(W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983) (regulation of ambulance
services entitled to immunity), United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-1103 (9th Cir. 1978)
(licensing of automobile drivers immune), Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 10330-1037-
1038 (6th Cir. 1979) (operating municipal airport traditional state function), and Molina-Estrada
v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845-846 (1st Cir. 1982) (operating highway
authority immune), with Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (regulation of traffic on public roads not traditional governmental
function), Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 644 F.2d 1334, 1340-1341 (9th
Cir. 1981) (regulation of air transportation not immune), and Williams v. Eastside Mental Health
Ctr., Inc., 669 F.2d 671, 680-681 (11th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982) (operation of
a mental health facility not entitled to immunity under National League of Cities).
57. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). At issue in Garcia was whether the San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority (SAMTA), a public mass-transit authority, could be subject to the minimum-
wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Citing its inability to define
the scope of the governmental functions protected under National League of Cities, the lack of
a workable standard for determining when a governmental function was traditional, and the
inconsistent results reached by the courts in their attempts to identify which governmental
functions were immune from regulation, the Court concluded that any attempt to define state
regulatory immunity in terms of"traditional governmental function" was "unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice" and expressly overruled that case. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.47.
58. See Mcjohn, supra note 10, at 17.
59. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-53. In other words, while recognizing that the Constitution
required protection of state sovereignty, the Court found sufficient protection in the procedural
safeguards of the constitutional structure, making substantive limits unnecessary. The procedural
protections referenced by the Court were such things as the Constitution's grant of only limited,
enumerated powers to Congress, the states' role in selecting members of the federal government,
and representation of the states in Congress. Id. at 550-51.
60. 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2428 (1992).
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United States v. New York did not rest on Tenth Amendment grounds,
the Court discussed the scope of the Tenth Amendment in relation to
congressional power. The Court reiterated that the text of the Tenth
Amendment does not directly limit the authority of Congress,6' but
it restrains congressional power by requiring the Court to determine
"whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation
on an Article I power."62 Recently, in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, the Court again considered traditional principles of federalism
in holding that the commerce power cannot be used to abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity from suit by private persons.63 Although
Seminole Tribe arose from a challenge to the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, the Court indicated that its reasoning would apply to
a broad range of cases. In particular, the Court specifically overruled
a previous decision that held that the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 authorized a
61. Id. at 2418.
62. Id. ("[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is
subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.").
63. 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
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private action against a state for monetary damages.' This was the
state of the law when the Court decided to hear Lopez.
III. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ 5
The issue before the Court in Lopez concerned the authority of
Congress to regulate citizens, rather than a state, and thus did not
raise the notion of federalism in the traditional sense.66 Nonetheless,
the Court considered principles of state sovereignty and essentially
concluded that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an impermissible
64. See Pennsylvania,v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). For some fifty years, the
predecessor of Union Gas had operated a coal gasification plant which produced coal tar as a
by-product. The plant was dismantled in 1950. In 1980, shortly after acquiring easements in the
property along the creek adjacent to the former plant and while excavating for flood control,
the state struck a large deposit of coal-tar which began to seep into the creek. EPA determined
that the coal tar was a hazardous substance and designated the area a Superfund site.
The United States jointly cleaned up the site with the state and reimbursed the state for
its costs. The United States then sought to recoup these costs from Union Gas under CERCLA
§§ 104 and 106, 142 U.S.C. §§ 9406, 9606 (1994), claiming Union Gas was liable because it and
its predecessor had deposited the coal tar into the ground near the creek. Union Gas brought
a third-party action against the state, asserting that the state was also responsible as an "owner
or operator" of the site under CERCLA § 107, 142 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). The appellate court's
initial decision affirming the district court's dismissal of the action based on Eleventh
Amendment immunity was vacated and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, passed while the petition for
certiorari was pending. On remand, the appellate court held that the amended language of
CERCLA clearly rendered the states liable for monetary damages and that Congress had the
power to do so when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
The Court, by a weak majority, affirmed, finding that because states were included in the
definition of persons, and excluded from the definition of owner or operator only in certain
limited circumstances, Congress intended states to be liable for clean up costs under CERCLA
§ 107. The Court further found that Congress had the authority to override the states' immunity
when legislating pursuant to its commerce power because that power is plenary. By ratifying the
Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, the states thereby relinquished their immunity
and consented to suits against them where Congress finds it necessary, in the exercise of the
commerce authority, to render the states liable.
The Court therefore held that Congress had the authority to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity and had done so in CERCLA.
65. 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
66. See Mcjohn, supra note 10, at 24 (arguing that the Lopez court left no doubt that the
question of traditionally state-regulated activity was now part of determining the extent of
federal commerce power and predicting that the principal doctrinal effect of Lopez will be that
state sovereignty concerns will move from a background policy concern in Commerce Clause
analysis to an explicit part of the test). The Court framed the main issue in Lopez as whether
firearm possession in a school zone substantially affects interstate commerce, but its actual
analysis was rooted in concerns for protecting state autonomy in areas traditionally left to state
control. Thus, it is important to understand the prevailing principles of federalism to fully
comprehend the import of Lopez.
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attempt by Congress to exercise a general police power over matters
traditionally left to the states.67
A. Facts
Alphonse Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at a Texas high
school, was found in possession of an unloaded .38 caliber revolver
and five bullets. 3 Lopez was initially charged under Texas law with
possession of a firearm on school premises.69 The state charge was
dismissed, however, after federal authorities charged Lopez with
violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.70
Lopez was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of
knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone, in violation of
§ 922(q)(1)(A).71 Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that § 922(q) unconstitutionally sought to legislate control
over the Texas public schools and exceeded Congress's enumerated
powers.7" The district court denied the motion, concluding that
§ 922(q) was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate
activities in and affecting commerce, and the "business" of schools
affects interstate commerce.7' Following a bench trial, Lopez was
found guilty of violating § 922(q) and sentenced to six months in
prison and two years on supervised release.74
On appeal, Lopez reargued his claims that the statute was an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional commerce power.75
Observing the absence of congressional findings establishing a
67. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1633. A constant thread throughout the majority opinion is the
concept that Congress is limited to the powers enumerated in the Constitution. For instance,
the Court stressed that the Constitution "withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that
would authorize enactment of every type of legislation." Id Similarly, the Court reaches its
decision because to accept the government's argument that the Act was constitutional would
"bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States." Id. at 1634.
68. Id. at 1626.
69. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN § 46.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994). See also Lopez, 115 S.Ct.
at 1626.
70. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789. The Act defines "school zone" as "in, or on the
grounds of, a public, parochial or private school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the
grounds of a public, parochial or private school." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (Supp. IV 1992).
71. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1626.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
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connection between gun possession in a school zone and interstate
commerce, the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that
§ 922(q) was an unconstitutional extension of the powers granted to
Congress under the Commerce Clause.76 In a five-to-four decision,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Act
neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement
that the possession be connected in any way to interstate com-
merce.
77
B. Majority Opinion of the United States Supreme Court
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 made it a federal
offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone."'78 The majority held that in enacting this statute,
Congress exceeded its authority to regulate commerce among the
several states.
79
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began with
"first principles": the Constitution creates a federal government with
enumerated powers, few and defined, while the powers remaining
with the states are numerous and indefinite.80 The Court engaged
in a lengthy review of the historical structure of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and ultimately identified three broad categories of
activity that can be regulated by Congress under its commerce power.
First, Congress may regulate use of the channels of interstate
commerce.81 Second, Congress may regulate instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and people or things that move in interstate
commerce, even where the threat to interstate commerce may come
solely from intrastate activities.' Finally, Congress may regulate
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.83
In this last category, decisions over the years had been unclear as
to whether an "effect" or a "substantial effect" on interstate com-
76. Id. at 1367-68.
77. Lopez,'115 S.Ct. at 1634.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp IV 1992).
79. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1626.
80. Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 45, at 292-293 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961)).
81. ld. at 1629.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1629-30.
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merce was required.' The majority acknowledged this past inconsis-
tency and summarily pronounced that the proper test was whether the
regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce.85
Applying this framework to the case at hand, the Court deter-
mined that only the third category had any potential application to
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.86 The issue as framed by
the Court, therefore, was whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act
regulated an activity that substantially affected commerce. In
determining this issue, the Court departed from the rational-basis
scrutiny traditionally employed in Commerce Clause cases. Prior to
Lopez, the Court had generally deferred to congressional determina-
tion that the interstate commerce nexus existed.' Congressional
action had previously been scrutinized only to the extent of determin-
ing whether Congress could rationally have concluded that a regulated
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.88 Although the
Lopez majority cited several cases in which the Court applied this
low-level scrutiny, deference was not granted in this case. Instead, the
Court engaged in its own evaluation of the effects gun possession in
a school zone had on interstate commerce.89
Conducting an independent analysis, the majority found the Act
deficient in three regards. First, the Court found that "[s]ection
922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define those terms."9 The Act also could not be sustained
under the Wickard line of reasoning because Section 922(q) was not
an essential part of a larger economic regulatory scheme that could be
84. Id. at 1630.
85. Id.
86. Id. (Court summarily dismissed the applicability of the first two categories, finding that
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. IV 1992) did not regulate "the use of the channels of interstate,
commerce" nor seek to protect "a thing in interstate commerce.").
87. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964).
88. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1629. See also, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. at 276-80; Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
379 U.S. at 252-253.
89. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631-32. See also, Mcjohn, supra note 10, at 27-28 (suggesting Court
has abandoned its previous deference to Congress in favor of its own independent assessment
of the effect on commerce); Adam D. Hirsh, United States v. Lopez: A Commerce Clause
Challenge, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 510-511 (1996) (theorizing that from now on the Court will
be less deferential and continue to engage in an independent review of congressional action).
90. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31.
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undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." The Court
reasoned that, unlike the Agricultural Adjustment Act under
consideration in Wickard, Section 922(q) did not regulate activity that
arises out of or is connected with a commercial transaction which,
when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce.
92
In addition, the Act was deficient because the challenged
provision had no jurisdictional element through which a case-by-case
inquiry could establish the requisite nexus between the firearm
possession in question and interstate commerce.93
Finally, the Court remarked on the complete absence of any
congressional indication of the burden on interstate commerce in both
the legislative history and the Gun-Free School Zones Act itself. The
Court acknowledged that formal congressional findings of the
substantial burden an activity has on interstate commerce are not
generally required.94 However, the absence of formal findings in this
case was significant because the connection between gun possession
in a school zone and interstate commerce was not readily apparent.
In reaching its ultimate conclusion that Section 922(q) was an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, the Court rejected the government's contention that posses-
sion of a firearm in a local school zone "does indeed substantially
affect interstate commerce."96 Attempting to establish the connec-
tion, the government argued that possession of firearms in school
zones affects interstate commerce by increasing violent crime. An
increase in violent crime deters citizens from traveling to areas
perceived to be unsafe, and further, the substantial cost of this
violence is spread through the population via the mechanism of
insurance.97 The government further argued that the presence of
guns in school zones threatened the educational process itself by
creating an environment hostile to learning, resulting in a less
91. Id. at 1631.
92. See id. That is, the Act was not a part of a larger regulation of economic activity in
-which the economic scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1631-32 (majority indicated that congressional findings are helpful in
evaluating whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce where, as
here, "no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye ...
96. Id. at 1632.
97. See id.
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productive citizenry, and ultimately adversely affecting the economic
health of the nation.98
The Court rejected these arguments, not because they failed to
establish a connection to interstate commerce, but because accepting
such arguments would have far-reaching implications to state
sovereignty. That is, if it accepted the "costs of crime" reasoning,
Congress would be empowered to regulate not only all violent crime,
but also any activity that might eventually lead to violent crime, even
where the connection to interstate commerce was quite thin.99
Similarly, by accepting the "national productivity" rationale, the Court
would be authorizing Congress to regulate every aspect of human
activity that might influence the* productivity of any individual
citizen.1° The majority expressed reluctance to expand the scope
of federal commerce authority in the manner suggested by the
government because Congress might thereby be authorized to regulate
in areas traditionally left to state control.'
Essentially, the majority rejected these arguments because of the
perceived need to find some outer limit to congressional commerce
power. The Court stated: "Under the theories that the Government
.presents ... it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,
even in areas ... where States historically have been sovereign.""
The Court reasoned that if it accepted the government's arguments,
it would be hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that"
Congress is without power to regulate. 3 The Court therefore
declined to extend the commerce power in the manner posited by the
government because to do otherwise would essentially convert the
power into a general police power of the sort retained only by the
states.' 4
While Lopez purports to be decided solely on the basis of the
Commerce Clause, the Court's determination that Congress exceeded
its authority under the Commerce Clause seems to be directed more
by a concern for state sovereignty than because the Act lacked the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The "national productivity" rationale could conceivably be extended to open to
federal control areas such as marriage, divorce, and child custody. Id.
101. Id. The areas the Court noted were traditionally in the state domain included criminal
law enforcement, education, and family relationships. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
'104. Id. at 1634.
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necessary nexus to interstate commerce.0 5 The implication of
Lopez is that the commerce power may now be limited by the
reservation of power to the states under the Tenth Amendment such
that an exercise of congressional power over an activity that affects
interstate commerce can nevertheless be found to be unconstitutional
if that federal regulation infringes on state sovereignty. By analyzing
the commerce authority in this fashion, the Court intejected the issue
of federalism into traditional Commerce Clause doctrine, potentially
imposing a new limitation on the commerce power and thereby
narrowing the reach of the Commerce Clause.10 6
IV. POTENTIAL LOPEZ CHALLENGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Because the Commerce Clause has long served as the principal
source of congressional authority to enact federal environmental
protection laws, the Court's resolution of Lopez may call into
question the scope and possibly the .validity of existing federal
environmental laws." 7  While it is true that some environmental
laws have been based on authority arising from other Constitutional
clauses, such as the Property Clause,103 most of the environmental
105. See id. at 1634 (expressing concern for maintaining the "distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local"). Lopez has been credited with being "a necessary first
step in the revitalization of federalism .... Frantz, supra note 10, at 174.
106. See Mcjohn, supra note 10, at 30 (arguing Lopez combines previously separate doctrines
of commerce power analysis and Tenth Amendment analysis to increase scrutiny of federal
regulation in areas of traditional state concern).
107. Recently, the Southern District of Alabama rejected a proposed consent decree and
dismissed a CERCLA complaint brought by the United States against the owner of a
manufacturing operation that had shut down in 1982. The court held that the Commerce Clause
did not authorize federal regulation of post-CERCLA contamination. The court interpreted
Lopez to require:
1) that the statute itself regulate economic activity, which activity substantially
affects interstate commerce; and 2) that the statute include a jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by case inquiry, that the statute in question
affects interstate commerce.
United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1532 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (appeal pending). The
court found it "doubtful" that CERCLA regulated an "economic activity" as that term is used
in Lopez, because the statute was aimed at non-functioning facilities. See Id. The court also
observed that the law regulating real property is a matter of traditional state concern and noted
the lack of a jurisdictional element in the statute. See Id. The government filed a motion for
expedited consideration of its appeal citing the impact of the ruling on other CERCLA cases.
See Recent Developments, 32 CIEM. WASTE LIT. R. 516 (1996).
108. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
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enactments depend on an expansive reading of congressional
commerce power t 9
The holding in Lopez opens the door to several potential
challenges to environmental statutes passed pursuant to the commerce
power. Under the language of Lopez, two substantive challenges
could be made: (1) that the regulated activity is not an "economic"
activity; and (2) that the regulated activity does not "substantially
affect" interstate commerce. Lopez might be read to suggest that the
determination of whether an activity is economic is a separate inquiry
from whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce."'
Under a strict application of the Lopez formulation, it may be
necessary to meet both prongs before Congress will be deemed to
have acted Within its Commerce Clause authority. If so, then
Commerce Clause authority arguably does not extend to all activities
substantially affecting interstate commerce, but only to those
"economic" activities with such an effect." About the only excep-
tion to this strict interpretation would be that in which the challenged
provision was "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated."' 2
On the other hand, the two factors might be applied as a
balancing test of sorts, such that a substantial impact on interstate
commerce would be sufficient to support federal regulation of even
a non-economic activity. Alternatively, it is possible that the
"economic" factor will prove to be a false limitation, because, as
109. See, eg., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)
(upholding regulation of adjacent wetlands under Clean Water Act against Commerce Power
challenge); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(upholding regulation of intrastate coal mining operations as within the commerce power);
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (upholding federal fishing license
program as valid under Commerce Clause); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471
F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979) (upholding application of Endangered Species Act to State of
Hawaii under commerce and treaty powers). P
110. Richard Lazarus, A Substantial Effect on EnvironmentalLaw, ENVTL F., July-Aug. 1995,
at 7 ("Whether the activity is 'economic' is a distinct judicial inquiry. It presents a threshold
question of kind, unlike th6 'substantially affecting' inquiry, which present a question of
degree.").
111. See id.; Hirsh, supra note 89, at 508 (commenting on the significance of the econom-
ic/non-economic distinction).
112. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631.
Spring 1997]
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
feared by the Lopez dissent, almost any activity can be classified as
economic."1
3
Lopez also lends itself to an underlying policy argument that the
regulated activity is one within an area of traditional state concern
and thus beyond the power of Congress to regulate. That is, an
intrastate activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce
may nonetheless be beyond Congress' authority to regulate if the
activity is in an area of traditional state concern.
Many environmental statutes will be capable of meeting even the
strictest application of Lopez. For instance, federal environmental
protection statutes that seek to control pollution will be capable of
satisfying the Lopez criteria because most pollution has significant
interstate effects and can generally be characterized as resulting from
"economic activity." Some environmentally harmful activity, however,
is arguably not economic and may not have the necessary connection
to interstate commerce."4
In the past, Commerce Cfause challenges to various environmen-
tal statutes have been largely unsuccessful."5  Under former inter-
pretation of the commerce power, courts always found a sufficient
nexus to interstate commerce to uphold congressional action." 6
Such findings were facilitated by the deference the Court has
traditionally accorded Congress. The Lopez court, however, appears
to have abandoned this deferential standard, preferring instead to
engage in an independent assessment of the substantial effects an
intrastate activity has on interstate commerce." 7 Therefore, certain
environmental statutes, in particular the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act, may now be vulnerable to challenge.
113. See id. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. For instance, Justice Thomas asserted his belief that Congress lacks the authority to
regulate littering. See id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. See, eg., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (holding
Congress can regulate adjacent wetlands pursuant to its Commerce Clause power); Hodel, 452
U.S. 264 (upholding Surface Mining & Reclamation Act against Commerce Clause challenge);
Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (holding Congress can regulate the taking of wildlife that affects
interstate commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
116. See, e.g., Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133-34 (holding integral relationship of
adjacent wetlands to navigable waters and importance of wetlands in protecting and enhancing
water quality is sufficient connection to interstate commerce to justify regulation pursuant to the
commerce power); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 280 (holding Congress could have had a rational basis for
concluding that surface mining has substantial effects on interstate commerce).
117. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31.
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A. Challenges to the Clean Water Act Section 404 Program
The Clean Water Act prohibits any discharge of dredged or fill
materials into "navigable waters" unless authorized by a permit issued
by the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)."8 Navigable waters
is defined by the Act as "waters of the United States."' 9 Although
the Corps initially construed the Act to cover only waters that were
actually navigable, in 1975, the Corps redefined "the waters of the
United States" to include tributaries of navigable waters, interstate
waters and their tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose
use or misuse could affect interstate commerce.'2 The Corps
further construed the Act to cover all freshwater wetlands that were
adjacent to other waters covered by the Act. The inclusion of
adjacent wetlands in the definition of navigable waters has been
challenged.as exceeding-the commerce power.1
2
'
1. Regulation of Adjacent Wetlands. In United States v. Byrd,122
the Seventh Circuit found that the commerce power was broad
enough to allow Congress to regulate adjacent wetlands. Byrd, a land
developer, attempted to fill swamp lands bordering Lake Wawasee in
Indiana to make them suitable for residential development." The
lake is a 2,500 to 3,000 acre freshwater lake used by interstate
travelers and seasonal residents for recreational purposes. 2" Byrd
asserted, in part, that Congress and the Corps lacked authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate activities on and around the
intrastate lake, even if the lake was used by interstate travelers."
Byrd argued that Congress lacked the authority to regulate non-
commercial activities on areas that were not within the traditional
definition of navigable waters, in particular, activities on adjacent
wetlands." The court rejected this argument, finding that Congress
118. 33 U.S:C. §§ 1311, 1344 (1994).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
120. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979); Riverside Bayview Homes,
474 U.S. at 133-34.
122. 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
123. See id. at 1205-06.
124. See iL at 1205.
125. See id. at 1209.
126. Id.
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intended to give the term "navigable waters" the broadest possible
interpretation." Thus, if Byrd's fill activity exerted a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce, that activity could be
regulated irrespective of whether it was wholly local. The-court found
Byrd's activity had such an effect, reasoning that destruction of the
wetlands surrounding the lake could impair the value of the lake to
interstate isitors by degrading the water quality, thus affecting the
flow of interstate commerce. The Court concluded that Congress
constitutionally may extend its regulatory control of navigable waters
under the Commerce Clause to wetlands adjacent to waters covered
by the Clean Water Act.'"
Similarly, in Riverside Bayview Homes, the Supreme Court held
that the regulation of wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate
waters and their tributaries was within the reach of the Commerce
Clause. 29 The Court first determined that Congress intended to
exercise its commerce power to its full extent and thus to regulate
under that authority even those areas not meeting the traditional
navigability test.' The Court found that regulation of wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters was permissible based on the integral
relationship between adjacent wetlands and the navigable waters and
the key role wetlands play in protecting and enhancing water
quality.' In particular, the Court noted that adjacent wetlands
filter and purify water, prevent flooding by slowing the flow of surface
127. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 92-236, at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3822, and
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975)).
128. Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1210. At the time Byrd was decided, Corps regulations expanded the
traditional definition of navigable waters to include intrastate lakes used by interstate travelers
for water-related recreational purposes and freshwater wetlands contiguous or adjacent to other
navigable waters and supporting freshwater vegetation. Id. at 1206. The court found these
regulations to be reasonably related to the Clean Water Act's stated purpose to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. Id. at 1210-1211.
129. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133-34. BecaUse
Congress had the authority under its commerce power to regulate navigable waters, the Court
reasoned that it likewise had the authority to regulate those wetland areas adjacent to those
waters that could have a substantial effect on commerce. Id.
130. See id. at 133. The Court deferred to the Corps' determination that wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters played a key role in protecting an enhancing water quality. See id. "We
cannot say that the Corps' conclusion that adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up with the
'waters' of the United States-based as it is on the Corps' and EPA's technical expertise-is
unreasonable.' Id. at 134. The Court concluded that the Corps'judgment about the relationship
between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that
adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Clean Water Act. See id.
131. Id. at 133-34.
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run-off, and serve as habitat for aquatic species. It was therefore
reasonable for the Corps to regulate all adjacent wetlands.'32
In light of this history, a challenge to federal jurisdiction over
adjacent wetlands under the Lopez framework would have little
chance of surviving any but perhaps the strictest application of Lopez.
If the "economic" requirement is applied as a threshold factor, one
might successfully argue against federal jurisdiction extending to the
regulation of private land development activities on privately owned
land.
However, under a more moderate application of Lopez, the
economic character of the activity is established by the fact that the
Byrd and Riverside Bayview Homes defendants were each engaged in
commercial land development.33 Further, the hydrologic connec-
tion between waters subject to Corps jurisdiction and their adjacent
wetlands establish the necessary connection to interstate commerce.
Activities conducted on adjacent wetlands substantially affect
interstate commerce by having a substantial and direct impact on the
quality of the body of water that is within the Corps jurisdiction. The
connection between fill activities on wetlands adjacent to covered
waters and interstate commerce is therefore obvious and clearly
within the reach of the Commerce Clause. Under the Wickard
reasoning, which is still endorsed and adhered to by the Court, even
wholly local development activities that have the potential, in the
aggregate, to exert a substantial effect on interstate commerce can be
regulated under the commerce power.l4
2. Regulation of Non-Adjacent Wetlands. A question specifically
reserved by the Court in Riverside Bayview Homes is whether
Congress has the authority to regulate nonadjacent waters, such as
isolated wetlands.'35 This presents a closer question when analyzed
in light of Lopez. Congress' authority to regulate isolated, intrastate
waters that share no surface connection to regulated waters, while not
132. Id. at 134-35.
133. See United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
134. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
135. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8.
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yet definitively addressed by the United States Supreme Court,136
has been presented to several lower courts.
In Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States,37 the district court was
called on to decide whether the Corps had jurisdiction over an
isolated wetland and could thus require the owner to secure a permit
prior to filling the land. The underlying issue was whether a sufficient
interstate commerce connection existed to warrant the exercise of
Corps jurisdiction over isolated wetlands. The standards used by the
Corps to determine when there was a sufficient connection to
interstate commerce to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction were
listed in a memorandum issued to all district Corps offices. 38 The
particular standard in question, the so-called migratory bird rule,
asserted Corps jurisdiction over "[w]aters which are used or could be
used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines."'139
The court did not reach the issue of whether the potential
presence of migratory birds was a sufficient connection to interstate
commerce to authorize congressional action. Rather, the court found
that the standards used by the Corps for determining its jurisdiction
were substantive rules." In promulgating these rules, the Corps
was required to comply with the notice and comment provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, but had failed to do so . 4
Accordingly, the court determined that the Corps did not have
jurisdiction. In dicta, the court expressed reservations that Corps
jurisdiction could be predicated on as tenuous a connection to
interstate commerce as the presence or potential presence of
migratory birds. The court noted that although it was not required to
decide the issue, it had "grave doubts that a property now so used, or
seen as an expectant habitat for some migratory birds, can be
136. But see Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 407 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). This
is the latest of the Leslie Salt suite of cases. Cargill, the successor in interest to Leslie Salt,
appealed after remand that the presence of migratory birds on its property did not create a
sufficient connection to interstate commerce to permit Corps regulation. See id. The Court's
denial of certiorari six months after its decision in Lopez is some indication that the so-called
migratory bird rule will survive a Lopez challenge. See id. Justice Thomas's dissent presumes
without discussion, that the filling of isolated wetlands is not an economic activity. Justice
Thomas disagreed that the mere presence of migratory birds is a sufficient'to establish the
necessary nexus to'interstate commerce after Lopez. See id. at 409.
137. 715 F. Supp. 726, 728 (E.D.Va. 1988),.affd per curiam, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 728-29.
141. See id. at 729.
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declared to be such a nexus to interstate commerce as to wairant
Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction[.]"' 4
Tabb Lakes was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit per curiam
without published opinion. However, the authority of Congress to
regulate isolated wetlands has been discussed by both the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits. 43
In Hoffnan Homes, Inc. v. EPA,' the Seventh Circuit was
called on to determine whether a small, isolated wetland was subject
to regulation under the Clean Water Act.45 Hoffman Homes, a
residential developer, had been penalized for violating the act by
filling in portions of two wetlands areas without a permit. In
disputing the penalties, Hoffman Homes challenged the EPA's
authority under the Clean Water Act to regulate the isolated wetland.
The EPA claimed jurisdiction solely on the basis that the isolated
wetland could potentially be used by migratory birds. Initially, the
court held that potential use by migratory birds could not form the
basis of congressional authority to regulate under the Commerce
Clause.'16 The court later vacated Hoffman Homes I, however, and
ultimately issued Hoffman Homes II, a much narrower opinion
limited to its facts. 47
In Hoffman Homes II, the court determined that the EPA could
reasonably interpret its jurisdiction to extend to waters with merely
a potential and minimal connection to interstate commerce.'
4
142. Id.
143. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Hoffmaan
Homes 11] (replacing prior opinion in Hoffman Homes v. Environmental Protection Agency, 961
F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Hoffman Homes ]); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896
F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991), on remand, 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D.
Cal. 1992), appeal after remand, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert denied 116 S.Ct. 407 (1995).
144. Hoffman Homes I, supra note 141, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992), withdrawn and
replaced by Hoffman Homes II, supra note 141, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
145. Findings of fact entered by the Administrative Law Judge showed that Area A, an
isolated wetland of less than an acre in dimension, had no surface or groundwater connection
to other regulated water. The ALl recognized that under administrative regulations, Area A
would be subject to EPA and Corps jurisdiction if the wetlands nevertheless affected interstate
commerce. Under agency regulations, the Corps and EPA consider an isolated wetland to affect
interstate commerce if, for instance, it serves as a habitat for migratory birds. However, no
evidence was presented that showed actual use by migratory birds of Area A nor of any special
characterisics that would attract migratory birds to Area A. Hoffnan Homes II, supra note 141,
999 F.2d at 259.
146. Hoffman Homes I, supra note 141, 961 F.2d at 1316-23.
147. Hoffman Homes II, supra note 141, 999 F.2d at 256, 261-62.
148. See id. at 261. The court reasoned -that the cumulative loss of wetlands reduces
populations of birds and consequently reduces the ability of people to travel in interstate
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Further, potential use by migratory birds of an isolated wetland could
reasonably establish that connection to interstate commerce.
149
While agreeing that the agency's interpretation was reasonable, the
court nevertheless determined that Hoffman Homes did not violate
the Clean Water Act. 5° Hoffman Homes admitted filling Area A,
but the court found that the EPA presented no evidence that Area A
was a suitable or -potential habitat for migratory birds prior to being
filled.' There was no evidence that migratory birds actually used
Area A, nor that Area A contained any characteristic that would
render it especially attractive to migratory birds compared to any
other land that at one time contains water. In so finding, the
court essentially required evidence of actual use or evidence that the
particular wetland was uniquely suitable 53 for use by migratory
birds to bring the wetland within the reach of the Act. Absent such
evidence, the court concluded "on the particular facts and findings
below that Area A is not subject to regulation under the Clean Water
Act.'' 4
Addressing a similar issue, the Ninth Circuit pronounced without
discussion that the Commerce Clause reaches local waters that might
provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species. 5 The
dispute in Leslie Salt centered around a parcel of property abutting
the San Francisco Bay National Wildlife Refuge and lying near
Newark Slough, a tidal arm of San Francisco Bay.5 6 Until 1959, the
property had been used for the production of salt.'57 The property
still contained pits and shallow basins that, had been excavated in
connection with the salt manufacturing process.5 For most of the
year, these artificially created pits and basins were dry. However,
commerce to trap, hunt, photograph or observe those species.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. That is, that the wetland sought to be regulated had some special characteristic that
would make potential use by migratory birds more likely. See id.
154. Hoffrnan Homes II, 999 F.2d at 262.
155. Leslie Salt v. United States, 896 F.2d 354,360 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1126
(1991), [hereinafter Leslie Salt I] (citing with approval Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 804 (10th
Cir. 1984)).
156. Leslie Salt v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Leslie Salt
111.
157. See id.
158. See id.
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during the rainy season the depressions filled with water, creating
temporary ponds that were visited by migratory birds.5 9 In 1985,
Leslie Salt began excavating a feeder ditch and siltation pond in an
attempt to drain the land. Upon learning that Leslie Salt was
discharging fill into the seasonally ponded areas, the Corps issued a
cease and desist order under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
Leslie Salt ified suit challenging the Corps's jurisdiction.
The district court held that the Corps had no jurisdiction over the
property because the ponds were artificially created and temporary
and thus not "other waters" as defined by agency regulations.' 6
The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding in part that the
ponds were not excluded from Corps jurisdiction simply because they
were artificially created and dry part of the year.161  The court
further held that "[t]he commerce clauise power, and thus the Clean
Water Act, is broad enough to extend the Corps's jurisdiction to local
waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered
species."' 6  The case was remanded to the district court for a
factual determination of whether any part of the property had
sufficient connection to interstate commerce to be subject to the
Corps's jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.'"
On remand, the district court found that some 12.5 acres of
seasonally ponded areas were subject to Corps jurisdiction based on
evidence that some 55 species of migratory birds actually used the
seasonally ponded areas as habitat."6 On appeal after remand, the
Ninth Circuit declined to reconsider its prior holding in Leslie Salt 11
that isolated, seasonally dry intrastate waters used only by migratory
birds are within the regulatory reach of the Clean Water Act, and
thus the Commerce Clause."6 The court held that its decision on
the prior appeal, that jurisdiction of the Corps under the Clean Water
Act reached isolated waters used only by migratory birds, was not
159. See id. at 1391.
160. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 476 (N.D.Cal. 1989) [hereinafter Leslie
Salt 1]. The court found that the temporary ponds and pits had been artificially created and were
dry most of the year, and thus held that the ponds did not come under the definition of "other
waters" in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1995). See id.
161. Leslie Salt 11, 896 F.2d 354, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991).
162. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
163. Leslie Salt !V, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995).
164. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 478, 480 (N.D.Cal. 1992) [hereinafter
Leslie Salt III].
165. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395.
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"clearly erroneous," and thus, under the doctrine of law of the
case,"6 did not warrant reconsideration.'67
Because Lopez arguably imposes substantive limits on Congress's
exercise of the commerce power, the holdings of Leslie Salt and
Hoffman Homes might be subject to challenge."6 At issue in each
case was the EPA's assertion of jurisdiction over isolated wetlands
"the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate
or foreign commerce." 69 This regulation has been interpreted to
require only a potential, minimal effect on interstate commerce. 70
Under the migratory bird rule, this minimal effect is satisfied if the
isolated wetland in question could potentially be used by migratory
birds.171
Each court's decision upheld the exercise of federal jurisdiction
over isolated wetlands solely on the basis of potential use by
migratory birds. Although the potential use of an isolated wetland by
migratory birds was characterized as a minimal connection to
interstate commerce, both courts found it sufficient to justify the
exercise of federal power. The Lopez decision, however, clearly
requires a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce to invoke the
commerce power. The question thus becomes whether the use or
166. Under law of the case doctrine, an appellate court generally will not reconsider matters
resolved in a prior appeal in the same case absent an intervening change in controlling authority,
new evidence, or a finding that the previous determination was clearly erroneous and would
work a manifest injustice. See id. at 1392-93.
167. See id. at 1396. The court noted:
The migratory bird rule certainly tests the limits of Congress's commerce powers
and, some.would argue, the bounds of reason. In this case, there is no evidence
of human contact'with the seasonally ponded areas. The only humans that hunt
or photograph the birds using these ponds apparently are doing so after they have
reached other locations. Nevertheless, given the broad sweep of the Commerce
Clause, the holding in Leslie Salt II cannot be considered clearly erroneous on this
ground.
Id.
168. For additional analysis of the impact of Lopez on environmental regulation spe
generally, Holman, supra note 12, and Hieneman, supra note 12.
169. 40 CFR § 230.3(s)(3) (1996).
170. See Hoffman Homes 1, 999 F.2d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1993) (Chief Judicial Officer
required EPA to show destruction of isolated wetland would have "some minimal, potential
effect on interstate commerce" to assert jurisdiction over the wetland; the minimal potential
effect was shown by proof that the subject wetland provided a suitable habitat for migratory
birds).
171. See id. at 261.
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potential use of an isolated wetland by migratory birds substantially
affects interstate commerce and thus justifies federal regulation over
the degradation of isolated wetlands.
In Hoffman Homes I, later vacated by the court but adopted as
part of the concurrence, Judge Manion asserted that the mere
presence of wildlife alone, whether actual or potential, has never been
sufficient to invoke the Commerce Clause power.7 , He argued that
migratory birds do not engage in commerce, even when flying
interstate, and do not "ignite the Commerce Clause" until they
are "watched, photographed, shot at or otherwise impacted" by a
person capable of participating in interstate commerce.74 Based on
the requirement in Lopez that the effect an activity has on interstate
commerce be substantial, Judge Manion's argument in Hoffman
Homes I might be used to argue against finding that the Commerce
Clause reaches isolated wetlands.
A rule permitting jurisdiction to be determined solely by
potential use of a wetland by migratory birds is arguably too
tenuously connected to interstate commerce to trigger the commerce
power in light of Lopez's substantiality requirement. 75 First, the
migratory bird rule may not be a good measure of when the filling of
an isolated intrastate wetland substantially affects interstate commerce
because it requires nothing more than finding that an isolated
wetlands be potentially suitable habitat. 76 Potential use of an
isolated wetland by migratory birds in no way connects that wetland
to any of the myriad of activities that normally serve as the interstate
172. Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d 1310,1320 (7th Cir. 1992) (incorporated in Hoffman Homes
11, 999 F.2d at 262 (Manion, J., concurring) citing Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S.
265 (1977) (holding the Commerce Clause broad enough to regulate the taking of fish in state
waters not because of the mere presence of the fish, but because of the effect on interstate
commerce, here the movement of vessels in search of fish, the catching of fish, and the transport
of the catch to processing plants)). See also United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1979)
(upholding Airborne Hunting Act based on effect on interstate commerce of people in interstate
commerce hunting; presence of birds incidental to constitutionality of Act).
173. See Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d at 1320 (incorporated in Hoffman Homes 11, 999 F.2d
at 262 (Manion, J., concurring)).
174. Id.
175. See Holman, supra note 12, at 195 (arguing that the Migratory Bird Rule is too tenuous
a link of isolated wetlands to interstate commerce to justify regulation pursuant to the
Commerce Clause). But see Morrissey, supra note 12, at 142-43 (suggesting CWA be amended
to extend federal protection to isolated wetlands as "waters of the United States" and
incorporating Migratory Bird Rule in definition).
176. See Holman, supra note 12, at 195 (arguing that the Migratory Bird Rule does not
guarantee that the filling of isolated wetlands will substantially affect interstate commerce).
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commerce links between wildlife and regulated waters. 17 7 The rule
requires no showing that-people participating in interstate commerce
interact in any manner with the migratory birds that might potentially
use a particular isolated wetland.
Often, as was the case in both Hoffman Homes and Leslie Salt,
the filling of isolated wetlands is for an economic purpose such as
commercial land development. In such cases, the first limitation
articulated by Lopez, that the regulated activity be economic, will be
satisfied if the Court interprets "economic activity" liberally.
However, because the Clean Water Act reaches private as well as
commercial activity, the migratory bird rule at least contemplates
jurisdiction over non-commercial, intrastate activity based solely on
minimal effects (i.e., potential effects) on migratory birds who might
have used the isolated wetlands.7 This is seemingly the same
posture the Gun-Free School Zones Act held before the Lopez
court.
179
A Lopez-type challenge to the migratory bird rule would
nonetheless be unlikely to succeed. Lopez itself recognizes that the
Commerce Clause authorizes regulation of local activities such as the
filling of an isolated wetland, if such activities exert a substantial
economic effect on intestate commerce.' While the destruction of
a single intrastate, isolated wetland may not substantially affect
migratory birds and consequently interstate commerce, the cumulative
effect of the degradation or destruction of all intrastate isolated
177. Typically, courts note the large number of interstate travelers spending billions of
recreational dollars to view, photograph, hunt, trap or study migratory birds. See, e.g., Hoffman
11, 999 F.2d at 261 (noting that throughout North America, "millions of people annually spend
more than a billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and observing migratory birds"); Palila v.
Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979) (noting
preservation of endangered species habitat "preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce
in these species and of interstate movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or
professional scientists who come to a state to observe and study these species"); see also Stephen
M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENvTL. L. 1, 38-39 (1993) (noting "com-
merce relating to migratory waterfowl alone exceeds billions of dollars per year in North
America").
178. See Holman, supra note 12, at 198 (noting the CWA regulates both commercial and
noncommercial activity to achieve its purpose of restoring the Nation's waters).
179. Thus, extending the commerce power to regulate the filling of isolated wetlands
arguably "would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
180. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; see also Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
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wetlands that provide habitat to migratory birds is substantial.''
The loss of habitat causes a decline in the populations of migratory
birds that in turn affects interstate commerce by causing a decline in
the opportunities for hunting, photographing, and observing migratory
birds."8  Thus, considering the billions of interstate dollars spent
annually on activities connected to migratory birds, the destruction of
individual, isolated wetlands could be regulated as a class of intrastate
activities which in the aggregate have a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce.'8
However, the treatment of federalism by the Lopez majority
suggests that if the activity is one within the realm of traditional state
concern,, the Court will be more hesitant in finding a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. In the alternative, Lopez could also be
interpreted to mean that where the federal government seeks to
regulate in an area of traditional state concern, the connection to
interstate commerce must be established without stacking "inference
181. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Wickard analysis). Johnson,
supra note 173, at 38-39, estimates that commerce relating to migratory waterfowl alone exceeds
billions of dollars per year in North America. Further.
The loss and degradation of habitat for migratory birds is a major cause of the
declining populations of waterfowl. Although the loss of individual isolated
wetlands may not have a direct impact on the ability of waterfowl to thrive, the
cumulative effect of the loss of numerous wetland habitats is devastating. As the
habitat for migratory birds decreases, greater numbers of birds are forced to share
less space, and "wetland ghettos" are created, where diseases spread rapidly. As
populations of migratory birds decline, the opportunities for hunting, photograph-
ing, and observing migratory birds decline. The loss of habitat, therefore, clearly
affects the interstate commerce of migratory birds.
Id. at 39. (citations omitted).
182. Johnson, supra note 173, at 39 n.204 (citing U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NORTH
AMERICAN WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT PLAN 1989, U.S.-Can. 1 (1989).); see also U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., 1994 UPDATE TO THE N. AMERICAN
WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT PLAN 4 (1994) (documenting that more than 30 million North
Americans spend several million dollars annually to observe, hunt or otherwise interact with
waterfowl) [hereinafter 1994 UPDATE].
183. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971) (upholding federal
jurisdiction over local loan-sharking operations because "[e]xtortionate credit transactions,
though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce"); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1992) ("That appellees's own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is
far from trivial"). But see Holman, supra note 12, at 196-98 (arguing that the filling of isolated
wetlands that have no impact on interstate commerce could not be included in the class of
regulated activity).
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upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressio-
nal authority under the Commerce, Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States."'' "
Arguably, jurisdiction based on the mere presence of migratory
birds is, without more, insufficient under Lopez to support congres-
sional commerce power.85 In Hoffman Homes I, Judge Manion
asserted that the presence of migratory birds is not in itself commerce
nor an economic activity. If this is so, a potential effect on interstate
commerce can be postulated only when the presence of wildlife
-provokes activities such as observation, hunting, trapping, or other
human endeavors engendered by the presence of migratory birds.
Consequently, if the wetland in question is not the situs of human
activity related to migratory .birds, the connection to interstate
commerce may arguably be too tenuous. 6
Judge Manion would require evidence that people travel
interstate to visit particular isolated wetlands to view, hunt, or
otherwise interact with wildlife before finding that Congress would be
authorized to regulate under the Commerce Clause."s It is unlikely
that non-commercial, privately-owned wetlands would be visited by
interstate travelers for the purpose of interacting with migratory fowl.
Nonetheless, requiring the direct conduct of interstate commerce
activity on the precise wetland sought to be regulated before the
commerce authority. is triggered ignores the realities of interstate
commerce in migratory birds.
Isolated Wetlands provide habitat to migratory birds whose
continued existence supports billions of dollars in interstate com-
merce.' The incremental destruction of migratory bird habitat
184. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1634.
185. See Holman, supra note 12, at 197-99 (maintaining this position).
186. See Holman, supra note 12, at 196 (arguing that wetlands with no impact on interstate
commerce, that is those wetlands on which no appreciation of migratory waterfowl is conducted,
could not be regulated under the Commerce Clause).
187. In Hoffman Homes I, incorporated into the concurrence of Hoffman Homes II, Judge
Manion queried that any spot in the United States is a potential landing spot for migratory birds,
including a puddle in the median of a highway. Thus he concluded "[t]he Commerce Clause, at
the very least, requires some connection to human commercial activity. It does not allow
regulation of animals just because they are animals which we want to protect. Commerce is a
uniquely human activity; thus, Congress, or the EPA, must demonstrate some human impact
before the Commerce Clause comes into play." Hoffman Homes 1, 961 F.2d 1310, 1321-22 (7th
Cir. 1992) (incorporated in concurrence to Hoffman Homes II, 999 F.2d 256, 263 (7th Cir.
1993)).
188. See 1994 UPDATE, supra note 178, at 20 (noting all migratory waterfowl and nearly half
of all threatened and endangered species, depend on wetland and associated upland habitats for
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directly and negatively impacts migratory bird populations and,
thereby interstate commerce.8 9 Isolated wetlands are a crucial link
in the direct chain of causation between healthy migratory bird
populations and interstate commerce.' 90 It should, therefore, be
irrelevant whether a migratory bird is ever observed, photographed,
or hunted at the particular isolated wetland in question. Unlike in
Lopez, the connection of isolated wetlands to interstate commerce is
well-documented and does not require the Court to "pile inference
upon inference" in a manner that gives rise to a general federal police
power.191 Consequently, although land use regulation is an area of
traditional state concern, the strength of the connection between
isolated wetlands and interstate commerce via migratory birds should
be more than sufficient to withstand a Commerce Clause challenge.
survival). The loss and degradation of migratory bird habitat is the major migratory bird
management problem in North America. Id.
189. Id. More than 30 million people participate in recreational activities focusing on
waterfowl and generate a "direct expenditure of several billion dollars annually." Id. at 4. Thus,
a healthy waterfowl population secures a strong economy in waterfowl-related recreation. A
decrease in waterfowl populations ultimately translates into fewer opportunities for waterfowl-
related recreation. The destruction of wetland and associated upland habitats needed for
breeding, migration and wintering has been cited as the principle cause of the drastic decline of
duck populations in the 20th Century. Id. at B-1.
190. See SuSAN M. GALATOwrrSCH & ARNOLD G. VAN DER VALK, RESTORING PRAIRIE
WETLANDS (1995). Waterfowl require wetland complexes, that is, a mix of wetland types, to
adequately satisfy requirements for food and shelter during different life stages of migration,
courtship, brood rearing and molting. ld. at 23. Seasonal changes in water levels and
temperatures affect the availability of food for migrating and breeding waterfowl. Id. Shallow
ephemeral basins, sheetwater areas, and temporary wetlands thaw much earlier than larger,
deeper and more permanent wetlands, and provide an early season food supply that is
unavailable in other, deeper wetlands nearby. Id- Small, temporary wetlands also isolate courting
pairs and provide loafing sites for males near nesting hens. Id. at 23-24. Habitat conditions along
migration routes and in wintering areas directly affect survival of migrating birds and influence
reproductive success the following spring. 1994 UPDATE, supra note 178, at B-3. Many key areas
of migration and wintering habitat have been lost and the quality of remaining habitat has
decreased substantially. Id.
191. See 1994 UPDATE, supra note 178, at 4 (recognizing the importance of waterfowl as
measurable indicators of a healthy environment).
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B. Challenges to the Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act (ESA),' 9 once held to be a valid
exercise of Congress's treaty-making and Commerce Clause pow-
ers,193 may also be vulnerable to a Lopez-based challenge. The
stated purposes of the ESA are the conservation of endangered and
threatened species and the protection of the ecosystems upon which
they depend.' 4 The ESA directs the Secretary of the Interior to
identify and list endangered or threatened species 95 and to desig-
nate their critical habitat.196 Under the ESA, it is unlawful for any
person to "take" endangered or threatened species.t97 The term
"take" is statutorily defined to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage
in any such conduct."'98 These descriptive terms are not otherwise
defined by the statute, however Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS)
regulations further define "harm" to include significant habitat
modification that kills or injures wildlife.19 9 In the same term that
Lopez was decided, the Supreme Court upheld the inclusion of
habitat modification as harm amounting to a "taking" under the ESA
against a facial challenge."°
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, the D.C. Circuit court's ruling that habitat modification was
not a taking under the ESA created a split in the circuits. The D.C.
192. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994) (hereinafter ESA).
193. Palla v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 999 (D.
Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
194. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994). The Secretary must determine which species are endangered
or threatened by using "the best scientific and commercial data available" and must take into
account State conservation efforts such as by predator control or protection of habitat. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(1)(A).
195. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1994).
196. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
197. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994).
198. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
199. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995). The regulations define the statutory term "harm" as follows:
Harm in the definition of 'take' in the Act means an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.
Id.
200. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S.Ct. 2407
(1995).
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Circuit reasoned that the statutory term "harm" referred only to the
direct application of force to an endangered species, and thus did not
include harm by an indirect means such as habitat modification. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fish & Wildlife Service
reasonably interpreted "harm" to include habitat modification.
Some fifteen years prior to the decision in Sweet Home, federal
authority to prohibit habitat modification under the takings provision
of the ESA was considered by the district court of Hawaii. In Palila
v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources,2"' the
defendants challenged the application of the Endangered Species Act
to the palila, an endangered Hawaiian bird, arguing that the Com-
merce Clause did not grant Congress the authority to enact federal
legislation concerning the species, since the palila neither moves
interstate nor inhabits federal lands. The district court rejected the
argument, holding that Congress had the authority to regulate the
palila through the ESA under its Treaty and Commerce powers.
The palila is a six-inch long finch-billed member of the Hawaiian
honeycreeper family that is found exclusively in the State of Ha-
waii.2" At the time of suit, experts agreed that the palila were
dangerously close to their minimal population level, below which the
species cannot fall without being doomed to eventual extinction.2 3
The State of Hawaii maintained populations of feral goats and sheep
for sport-hunting within a State Game Management Area that
encompassed most of the palila critical habitat. 4  The grazing
habits of the goats and sheep had a destructive impact on the
mamane-naio woodlands, the critical habitat of the palila.25
An action for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed in the
name of the palila, pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of
1973."o Complainants contended that the defendants were "tak-
ing"' the palila in violation of Section 9 of the ESA by maintaining
201. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
202. Pala, 471 F. Supp. at 988.
203. Id
204. Id. at 989.
205. Id at 990. The feral sheep and goats feed on the mamane trees. See Palila v. Hawaii
Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988) (Palila IV). The palila
is totally dependent on the mamane-naio woodlands; it feeds, shelters, and nests on the mamane
tree. Id. at 1107 n.2.
206. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1543 (1994).
207. The Act defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
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destructive populations of feral sheep and goats in the palila's critical
habitat.203
The State of Hawaii challenged the power of the United States
to enforce the ESA against it on behalf of the palila." 9 The defen-
dants argued that the state had exclusive sovereignty over the
palila." ' Finding that Congress had determined that the protection
6f any endangered species anywhere is of the utmost importance to
mankind and that a major cause of extinction is the destruction of
natural habitat, the district court rejected the defendants' Tenth
Amendment argument."'
In this context, a national program to protect and improve
the natural habitats of endangered species preserves the
possibilities of interstate commerce in these species and of
interstate movement of persons, such as amateur students
of nature or professional scientists who come to a state to
observe and study these species, that would otherwise be
lost by state inaction.21 2
Thus, the court concluded that the Tenth Amendment did not restrict
enforcement of the ESA against the state because it was a valid
exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce. The district
court's order that the State of Hawaii remove the goats and sheep was
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.214
a Great Oregon, 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995), "taking" also specifically includes habitat modification.
208. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 987.
209. Id. at 992.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 994-95.
212. Id. at 995.
213. Id. The court also noted that the ESA could be upheld as a legitimate exercise of
Congress's power to enact legislation implementing valid treaties. Id. at 993-94. The court noted
that the ESA specifically implemented the United States-Japan Convention for the Protection
of Migratory and Endangered Birds, and the Convention on Nature and Wildlife Preservation
in the Western Hemisphere. Id. at 993.
214. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (Palila
fl). Five years later, the Sierra Club amended its original complaint to add mouflon sheep as
destructive animals to be removed from the palila's habitat. The mouflon sheep, game animals
introduced by the State in the 1960s, were not included in the original complaint because their
impact on the palila's critical habitat had'not yet been determined. The mouflon sheep also feed
on the mamane trees. The district court found the presence of the mouflon sheep harmed the
palila by destroying the mamane woodland through grazing and thus caused habitat degradation
that could result in extinction. The court also found that the mamane woodland would not
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Had the issue'in Palila been decided after Lopez, the decision
regarding Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause might
have been different. In Palila, the trial court concluded that the
Tenth Amendment did not restrict enforcement of the ESA against
the State of Hawaii because the ESA was a valid exercise of
Congress's commerce power. The court found sufficient links to
interstate commerce in that the ESA preserved the possibilities of
interstate commerce in endangered species in the future and interstate
movement of persons wishing to view or study endangered species.
The primary question thus becomes whether, after Lopez, the
possibility of some future effect on interstate commerce is sufficient
to trigger congressional regulation of private activity under the
commerce power.215
Today, in the wake of Lopez, Congress has the authority to
protect endangered species such as the palila pursuant to the
commerce power only if the regulated activity, "substantially affects"
interstate commerce. Lopez indicates further that the regulated
activity must be economic before Congress will-be found to have
acted pursuant to its commerce powers. 216  Whether an activity is
economic or commercial, however, is a matter of definition.217  The
Lopez majority itself concedes that "depending on the level of
generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial. 218
Despite the uncertainty engendered by its determination, the majority
adheres to the distinction in order to preserve the balance of state and
federal power.219 Therefore, to pass Lopez muster, the degradation
regenerate with the continued presence of the mouflon sheep and the palila would not recover
to a point where it could be de-listed. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 649
F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986) (Palila III). The Ninth Circuit again affirmed that harm includes
habitat degradation that could result in extinction, and concluded that the finding of a taking
under the ESA was not clearly erroneous. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources,
852 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1988) (Paila V). The appellate court did not reach the issue of
whether harm includes habitat degradation that prevents recovery of an endangered species. Id.
at 1110-11.
215. See Holman, supra note 12, at 178-79 (suggesting the "habitat-harm" regulation is
similar to the provision struck down in Lopez and therefore oversteps Congress's power to enact
legislation under the Commerce Clause).
216. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) ("[w]here economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
217. But see Holman, supra note 12, at 179-80 (arguing that the ESA is not essentially an
economic-based statute).
218. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
219. Id. Explaining the necessity, despite the difficulty, of distinguishing commercial activity
subject to congressional commerce authority from noncommercial activity, the Court stated:
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or modification of an endangered species' habitat would have to be
found an "economic activity" having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce:
Where habitat degradation occurs incident to commercial
development, it is not difficult to characterize the activity as econom-
ic. So, for instance, clear-cutting a stand of trees that is critical
habitat to the red-cockaded woodpecker" for the sale of lumber 'or
the development of a shopping center might easily be classified as
commercial activity. On the other hand, habitat-modifying activity
engaged in by a landowner for his own, rather than commercial
benefit, is not as easily identified as economic activity. If the term is
narrowly defined, the land-owner who clear-cuts critical habitat of the
red-cockaded woodpecker to build a swimming pool or tennis court
may not be engaged in economic activity because his activity is for
personal rather than commercial interest. Using a more flexible
definition of the term, however, the landowner seeking to improve his
property is arguably engaged in commercial activity to the extent that
he hires contractors, or rents or purchases materials, equipment, or
supplies. One might also argue that activity directly affecting the
value of property is commercial because of the potential for sale of
the property.
Economic activity alone is insufficient to trigger the Commerce
Clause; Lopez also requires that the activity substantially affect
interstate commerce. Similar to the migratory bird rule discussed
But, so long as Congress's authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the
Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as having
judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the C6mmerce
Clause always will engender 'legal uncertainty' .... Any possible benefit from
eliminating this 'legal uncertainty' would be at the expense of the Constitution's
system of enumerated powers.
Id. (citations omitted).
220. This woodpecker was listed as an endangered species in 1970 pursuant to the statutory
predecessor of the ESA. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1995) (issued pursuant to the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 275); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communi-
ties for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2410 n.4 (1995) (explaining same). The red-cockaded
woodpecker has frequently been the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926
F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (challenge to timber management activities as having an adverse impact
on the red-cockaded woodpecker); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 67 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1995)
(challenge to U.S. Forest Service even-aged logging management practice for habitat of red-
cockaded woodpecker); see also State of Texas v. United States Forest Serv., 805 F.2d 524 (5th
Cir. 1986) (holding state not entitled to stay pending appeal of USFS plan to clear cut area of
national forest and noting special consideration given by U.S. Forest Service to nine colonies of
red-cockaded woodpecker in area to be managed).
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above, whether the habitat modification regulation can survive a
Lopez-based challenge must turn on the strength of the links
established between endangered species and interstate commerce.
In Palila, the district court found that habitat modification
affected interstate commerce by preserving the possibility of future
trade in the palila. Preserving the potential for future trade in an
endangered species, however, seems a remote and intangible concept
to characterize as a substantial effect.22'
The Palila court also noted that the habitat modification
regulation preserves the possibility of the interstate movement of
people seeking to study or view endangered species. This justification
of federal jurisdiction parallels the analysis associated with the
migratory bird rule. Degradation of critical habitat causes a decline
in population of the endangered species, thus presenting fewer
opportunities for people to travel interstate to study or view the
species.222
The argument is less compelling, however, in regard to the
habitat modification regulation than in regard to the migratory bird
rule. Preservation of potential migratory bird habitat on isolated
wetlands preserves interstate commerce in migratory birds even where
that commerce-related activity occurs on land other than the wetland
sought to be regulated. It is not necessary to the success of the
argument that people travel interstate to the precise location of the
isolated wetlands sought to be regulated; that isolated wetlands are
necessary to support continued interstate commerce in migratory birds
at other locations is sufficient.
On the other hand, where critical habitat of an endangered
species is completely contained within the boundaries of privately
owned land, the connection to interstate commerce is less obvious,
and it might be necessary to show that people travel interstate to
interact with the endangered species on that land. Persons wishing to
view or study an endangered species have no right to enter privately
221. Moreover, to effect its purpose of conserving endangered species, the ESA bans
commerce in endangered species. It seems counter-intuitive, therefore, that the potential for
future trade in endangered species could serve as a sufficient basis for federal jurisdiction. See
Holman, supra note 12, at 184 (arguing that "future entrance into commerce" is an insufficient
basis for commerce power because ESA purports to ban traffic in endangered species, not
enable it). This argument is somewhat flawed because the essential purpose of the ESA is
recovery of endangered species to a point where it is no longer endangered. Once a species
recovered sufficiently to be de-listed, the possibility of trade in that species revives.
222. Indeed, species driven to extinction by critical habitat destruction present no
opportunity for the interstate movement of people.
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owned property to do so. The possibility of such interstate travel,
therefore, may be too remote and intangible to support the conclusion
that its curtailment via habitat modification would substantially affect
interstate commerce. A commerce power premised on such an
abstract, theoretical possibility, it might be argued, is one that
threatens to obliterate the distinction between national and local
control and to convert congressional commerce power to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States.224
Moreover, as was the case in Lopez, the ESA takings prohibition
contains no jurisdictional element linking a particular violation of
Section 9 to a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' Further,
the ESA also lacks any congressional findings that conservation of
endangered species substantially affects interstate commerce. 6
Thus, at least where endangered species habitat degradation results
from a private use of privately-owned land,2Z7 Lopez might arguably
support a conclusion that the federal government is without authority
to regulate.2' This may be especially true because regulation of
land use is an area trdditionally considered to be within a state's
police power.
Simply because private activity is engaged in on private land is
not, however, sufficient to remove an activity from federal regulation.
Judicial interpretation extends commerce authority over wholly local
activity, even where that activity has minimal or no impact on
commerce, if, in the aggregate, the class of activity substantially
affects interstate commerce. 9  Under the class theory, Section 9
takings through habitat modification by a private individual on private
land could be regulated as a class of activities, the regulation of which
223. See Holman, supra note 12, at 184 (asserting "'possibility-of-travel' argument would not
apply where species is ensconced on private land").
224. Id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1629-34 (1995).
225. Holman, supra note 12, at 185.
226. Id.
227. This argument also presumes that the species is non-migratory and its critical habitat
is wholly contained on private land.
228. In Lopez, the Court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994) was an unconstitutional
extension of Congress's commerce power after finding that (1) the section was "a criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms[;]" (2) it contained "no jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce[;]" and (3) the statute lacked any congressional findings of the substantial
effect on interstate commerce and "no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye[.]"
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-32.
229. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act, the preservation of
endangered species."
Because of the federalism concerns expressed in Lopez, Palila
also raises the question of the federal government's authority to
regulate states as states. The Lopez notion of federalism suggests that
the Court will hesitate to find a substantial effect on interstate
commerce where the activity is in a realm traditionally left to state
control. This notion would appear to be a resurgence of the National
League of Cities concept that the Tenth Amendment limits the
commerce power in a manner that allows the states to "structure
integral operations in areas of traditional government functions." 1
Lopez implies that there are areas of exclusive state regulation
but does not identify categorically those areas reserved exclusively to
the states. Assuming a revitalization of substantive limits on the
commerce power based on the enumeration of powers doctrine and
the Tenth Amendment, if Palila were decided today, the result could
likely favor the State. A state performing a traditional governmental
function, such as the regulation of state lands, could be immune from
congressional regulation. If the ESA was shown to be destructive to
state sovereignty, as could certainly be argued about the enforcement
of the ESA against a state on state lands, it is at least conceivable that
the Court would now hold that Congress lacked commerce power to
enforce the ESA against the state.
Nevertheless, a lack of congressional commerce power to enforce
the ESA does not necessarily mean that the Act is unenforceable
against the states. The ESA has been held to be predicated not solely
on the Commerce Clause, but also on the treaty power. Thus, other
possible bases for enforcing the ESA exist, and the ultimate outcome
of the issue may be no different. However, depending on the rigidity
with which the Court applies Lopez, the commerce power might be
insufficient to sustain the enforcement of the ESA against the states
as states. Ultimately, considering the extent to which federal
regulations can infringe on a state's freedom to structure its integral
governmental operations, the Tenth Amendment may once again be
230. But see Holman, supra note 12, at 181-183 (arguing that non-commercial intrastate
habitat-modification can be regulated as a class only if such regulation is essential to an overall
scheme to regulate interstate commerce; since the underlying purpose of the ESA is not
essentially commercial, private habitat-modification cannot be regulated under a class theory).
231. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,852 (1976). See also Gardbaum, supra
note 10 (suggesting Lopez might have been attempting to fashion new and fresh approach to
issue of federalism).
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read to impose substantive limits on congressional power to regulate
the states' control of their own lands and the wildlife thereon.
CONCLUSION
Lopez raises complex issues regarding the nature and scope of
federal authority under the Commerce Clause and the concept of
federalism. Arguably, Lopez revives the notion of substantive
limitations on congressional commerce power. What is clear from the
case is that a majority of the Court is unwilling to allow Congress to
be the final arbiter of its own power 2 By considering principles
of federalism in analyzing congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause, the Court seemingly contemplates that certain areas of
law are the exclusive province of the states.
Whether Lopez presents a real threat to environmental regula-
tion can only be tested by time. It can be expected that Lopez will
be the vehicle by which many federal environmental statutes will be
challenged. 3 At first glance, many environmental statutes appear
to be vulnerable to challenge. Many of the statutes lack legislative
findings of the substantial effect the subject of regulation has on
interstate commerce. Many statutes contain no jurisdictional element
that would establish, through case-by-case inquiry, the necessary
connection. In addition, many environmental statutes regulate areas
historically considered the concern of the states.
The ultimate impact of Lopez on environmental regulation will
turn on how its requirements are defined and applied. A strict
application of Lopez might require the challenged statute to regulate
economic activity, to be essentially economic regulation. If that
hurdle were cleared, the regulated activity would then be examined
to determine whether it had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Lopez seems to indicate that the Court will be less
inclined to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce if the
regulated activity is an area of traditional state concern. Because the
Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other environ-
mental protection schemes regulate areas that traditionally have been
considered the province of the states, such as land-use, future cases
232. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (appeal
pending)' (holding commerce authority did not extend to regulation of post-CERCLA
contamination).
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may conclude that federal environmental regulation represents a
constitutionally impermissible exercise of a federal police power.
More likely, however, Lopez will not be interpreted to permit
the wholesale abandonment of federal environmental regulation. The
impact of Lopez will be tempered by difficulty in applying the Court's
limitations. The distinction between economic and non-economic
activity is not likely to survive the test of time. Indeed, there is little
reason to distinguish between two local activities that have an
identical effect upon interstate commerce if one but not the other is
commercial in nature.' That is, no reasonable rationale could
justify federal regulation over destruction of wetlands by a commercial
land developer but not over destruction of wetlands by the private
homeowner. The effect on interstate commerce, such as the negative
impact on migratory bird populations, is the same and should be
regulated similarly.
In addition, most, if not all, environmental statutes in fact have
a substantial connection to interstate commerce. Conceivably, the
stronger the connection to interstate commerce, the less weight that
will be given to other factors. For example, the migratory bird rule
will likely survive a Commerce Clause challenge because the potential
impact on interstate commerce in migratory birds is well-document-
ed. 5 That the rule regulates in an area traditionally left to the
states becomes a secondary consideration where a substantial effect
on interstate commerce can be shown. Lopez is a difficult decision
to understand and may prove to be even more difficult to apply. It
remains to be seen whether the case signals a new era of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.
234. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235. In fact, the denial of certiorari in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied sub nom. Cargill v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995), is a fairly strong
indication that the Court would find that actual or potential use of a wetland by migratory birds
is sufficient to establish federal authority to regulate.
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